Witnora turns a reviewed Promotion Grant into a short-lived, single-use deployment credential. The credential is bound to one project, mutation, artifact SHA-256, deployment target, adapter, and authenticated principal. Possessing a Promotion Grant alone is not sufficient to deploy.
This name is intentionally narrower than the legacy filename. The mechanism enforces only registered deployment boundaries; unmanaged credentials and undeclared deployment paths remain outside its claim.
Register a project identity provider with these constraints before the first workflow exchange:
{
"name": "GitHub Actions deployment",
"kind": "OIDC",
"vendor": "STANDARD",
"issuer": "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com",
"jwksUri": "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com/.well-known/jwks",
"audiences": ["witnora-deployment-broker"],
"allowedAlgorithms": ["RS256"]
}
Use Kakarottoooo/witnora/actions/promotion-enforcement@v0.9.3 in a protected
GitHub Environment for the reference GitHub flow. Use
witnora/deployment-enforcement for a customer gateway or the Kubernetes
AdmissionReview handler. The Kubernetes reference requires digest-pinned
container images and the following workload annotations:
witnora.com/deployment-credential-idwitnora.com/artifact-digest-sha256witnora.com/deployment-uriThe reference deployment is in
examples/deployment-enforcement/kubernetes/deployment.yaml.
Rollback credentials are owner/admin operations and bind only the declared
parent digest. Break-glass credentials are owner-only, short lived, limited to
the declared parent or candidate, and immediately suspend continuous assurance.
Both operations create signed enforcement events and require independent
revalidation before assurance can return to CURRENT.
GitHub Environment approval protects the workflow entry point. It is not, by itself, a cluster or cloud authorization boundary. Production deployments must place credential admission in a customer-controlled gateway, Kubernetes admission webhook, or equivalent cloud deployment adapter whose service account is the only principal allowed to mutate the target.
This protocol proves that Witnora admitted one declared artifact and target under one verified identity and one bounded authorization. It does not prove that an administrator could not bypass an incorrectly configured customer IAM policy, that the application behaved correctly after deployment, or that the deployed bytes remained unchanged. Independent outcome and deployed-artifact probes remain required.